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Entrepreneurship, College and Credit:
The Golden Triangle
Roberto M. Samaniego Juliana Yu Suny
October 16, 2018
Abstract
We develop a model to evaluate the aggregate impact of college nance in an envi-
ronment with entrepreneurship. The calibrated model captures the stylized fact that
entrepreneurs with college are more common and more protable in the US. The cal-
ibration indicates this is mainly because higher labor earnings allow college educated
agents to ameliorate credit constraints if and when they eventually become entre-
preneurs. Changes in nancing constraints on entrepreneurs can thus a¤ect college
attendance, and changes in nancing constraints on college can a¤ect entrepreneurship
rates as well.
1 Introduction
Education and entrepreneurship are important determinants of the wealth of nations. Ed-
ucation represents the accumulation of human capital, whereas entrepreneurship is key for
accounting for patterns of nancial capital accumulation for example, in the United States
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entrepreneurs account for a disproportionate share of the wealthiest households. In addition,
the accumulation of capital through both education and entrepreneurship are thought to be
limited by borrowing constraints. This is one reason why, around the world, higher education
is often at least partially subsidized.1
Empirical work shows that entrepreneurs in developed economies disproportionately come
from among the college-educated, who also appear to make more protable entrepreneurs.2
This suggests that the incentives to go to college and to become entrepreneurs are inter-
twined. If so, nancing constraints on either of these two activities may a¤ect both human
and nancial capital accumulation. However, prior work has not studied the extent of these
interactions.3 There has also been no work trying to explain why entrepreneurs are more
likely to be college educated. Is it because the college educated are more likely to make
better entrepreneurs, or is it because they are wealthier? Also, what are the welfare im-
plications of public nancing of higher education in an environment where education and
entrepreneurship might interact?
This paper studies the impact of education nance when both college education and
entrepreneurship experience borrowing constraints. We develop a general equilibrium model
featuring both, and argue that the true impact of either form of nancing constraint on
aggregate outcomes cannot be assessed in isolation: the interactions among them are key
to understanding the impact of nancing constraints on aggregate outcomes, as well as
the role of entrepreneurship and education in the determination of aggregate outcomes.
That is, nancing constraints on entrepreneurship a¤ect the decision to become educated
1Regarding the disproportionate share of entrepreneurs among the wealthy see Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997)
and Cagetti and de Nardi (2006). On borrowing constraints, see Becker (1975) regarding education and Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) regarding entrepreneurship. Regarding the inalienability of human capital see Hart
and Moore (1994). See for example Myers and Rajan (1998) regarding the di¢ culty of using physical or
nancial capital as collateral.
2See Bates (1990), Parker and van Praag (2006) and Mondragon-Velez (2009).
3The related literature either does not have entrepreneurs or does not have college education, see for
example Cagetti and de Nardi (2006) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011). Terajima (2006) develops a
general equilibrium model with both entrepreneurs and college, but there are no nancing constraints.
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specically, the decision to attend college and nancing constraints on education a¤ect
entrepreneurship rates, as well as aggregate outcomes. This paper is the rst to study the
joint impact of college education and entrepreneurship in a general equilibrium framework
with nancing constraints.
To understand these interrelations, consider the following see Figure 1. Borrowing lim-
its on entrepreneurs have been shown to account for the otherwise puzzling fat right tail in
the US wealth distribution, since the di¢ culty of raising external funds gives entrepreneurs
a powerful incentive to accumulate wealth see Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). The empirical
literature on the other hand delivers mixed results on the importance of nancing constraints
for entrepreneurship rates and entrepreneurial returns, in part because of problems identify-
ing nance separately from ability variables, see Holtz-Eakin et al (1994), Hurst and Lusardi
(2004), Blanchower (2009), Buera (2009) and Jensen et al (2014) for contrasting views.
However, even if one concludes that nancing constraints are not key determinants of en-
trepreneurship rates or entrepreneurial scale, Bates (1990), Parker and van Praag (2006)
and Mondragón-Vélez (2009) and others nd that a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs
is college-educated, indicating that education could be a key potential determinant of en-
trepreneurial skill. If agents are barred from attending college by the inability to borrow,
then nancing constraints may signicantly lower the number of entrepreneurs even if no
agents report being unable to take advantage of an entrepreneurial opportunity because of
nancing constraints. Similarly, reductions in the protability of entrepreneurship due to
borrowing constraints may disproportionately lower the return to college, so that nancing
constraints lead some agents to nd it optimal not to go to college even when no agent reports
that borrowing constraints limit them from going to college. Such interrelations may imply
that studies of entrepreneurship that ignore education (and vice versa) fail to identify key
channels through which borrowing constraints a¤ect labor market and aggregate outcomes.
This also implies that the impact of public nancing of college may be di¢ cult to evaluate
without considering its impact on entrepreneurial activity. Finally, are the college-educated
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more likely to become entrepreneurs because they make better entrepreneurs, or because the
college educated have higher wealth and are therefore less constrained? This matters for the
answers to all the other questions. If college educated entrepreneurs are intrinsically more
productive, then subsidizing education would not just increase the stock of human capital
but would also raise productivity. Even if not, any benets from subsidizing education would
depend on whether they signicantly relax nancing constraints on would-be entrepreneurs.
We develop a general equilibrium model to analyze the role of borrowing constraints in
agentshuman capital investment decisions and occupational choices. Borrowing constraints
arise because of a limited enforcement constraint: agents may default on their loans, in which
case they are subject to punishment. While no default occurs on the equilibrium path, the
extent to which agents can borrow is endogenously limited by the possibility of default.4 In
the model, agents have labor market ability, and also an entrepreneurial ability process, each
of which may be a¤ected by education. We then calibrate the model to match data on the
wealth distribution, occupational choice and college attendance in the US. The calibration
process matches model statistics to those of US data, pinning down the key parameters
of the model that govern the returns to di¤erent activities and thus the educational and
occupational choice decisions. The calibrated model also replicates basic features of the US
wealth distribution, as well as the fact that agents with low labor market ability are less
likely to go to college.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In the calibrated model, we nd that college-educated entrepreneurs are as productive as
the uneducated. In addition, they are equally likely to have entrepreneurial opportunities.
Small changes in the values of the parameters governing entrepreneurial opportunities and
4See Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and de Nardi (2006, 2009) and Buera et al (2011) for models with similar
constraints.
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productivity cause large changes in the matched statistics (such as the relative income and
prevalence of enterprises run by people with or without college), indicating that the nding
is robust.5 Thus, both the returns to labor and the returns to potential entrepeneurship
encourage investment in education, but the main reason for the latter factor is that education
tends to generate more potential wealth for would-be entrepreneurs, and that the wealthy
are more likely to become educated. This nding is consistent with Aghion et al (2016) who
nd that children of wealthy parents are more likely to become educated and to become
inventors (dened as people who register a patent), but that this is mainly because of agent
type rather than an independent e¤ect of either wealth or education.6
This nding has important consequences for our subsequent questions regarding the im-
pact and interrelationships between di¤erent types of nancing constraint. To answer the
questions posed earlier, we nd that:
 nancing constraints on education have a large impact on the composition of entre-
preneurship. Disallowing agents from borrowing for college lowers the share of college
educated agents from 29 to 12%, and the share of educated entrepreneurs drops from
41 to 18 percent, although entrepreneurs with college are disproportionately protable
(as college nancing constraints make college more of a privilege of the wealthy). It
also lowers entrepreneurship rates modestly from 7:5 to 7:20 percent.
 tightening nancing constraints on entrepreneurship lowers the number of entrepre-
neurs from 7:5 to about 4 percent. This lowers the di¤erences in the protability of
entrepreneurship across educational groups, since the relative lack of entrepreneurs
implies that the wealth distribution is atter.
5When we matched the model statistics assuming no support for college whatsoever in the benchmark
economy, we found the same. On the use of calibration as an econometric tool see Kydland and Prescott
(1996) and Cooley (1997) inter alia.
6While this relates to inventors rather than entrepreneurs, patenting should be the subset of entrepre-
neurial activity most likely to display a strong independent relationship with higher education, yet they do
not nd one.
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 both kinds of constraints have signicant aggregate impact. For example, disallowing
agents from borrowing for college lowers GDP by 14 % in the steady state equilibrium.
Disallowing agents from borrowing for entrepreneurship lowers GDP by 36%.7
Our policy experiments indicate other important interactions between credit constraints
on education and entrepreneurship. For example, depending on assumptions about the
extent to which college subsidies are "passed through" into higher college prices, we nd
that subsidizing education can increase income and welfare by more than double the impact
of removing credit constraints on education. This is because the subsidies allow households
not to deplete their wealth on a college education, so young college-educated agents may start
their rms earlier or at a larger scale. Above a 70 percent subsidy rate, the policy becomes
mainly redistributive (rather than relaxing any nancing constraints) and above that rate
income and welfare deteriorate. Education grants only for agents who cannot a¤ord college
by themselves have a uniformly increasing impact on income and welfare, although they are
less powerful than subsidies. Finally, it turns out that in terms of income and welfare, the US
college nancing scheme is equivalent in terms of GDP and welfare (relative to a world with
no support at all) to a pure college subsidy rate of around 30 percent of cost, or a need-based
grant rate of about 50 percent. This provides, for the rst time we believe, a sense of where
the intensity of support for college in the US lies in the spectrum of possibilities.
We underline that the purpose of this paper is to study entrepreneurship in a developed
economy context. Specically, the model is calibrated to match statistics for the United
States. A di¤erent approach to calibration would be appropriate to a developing country
context, where self employment rates are extremely high (Gollin 2002) specically, we could
introduce more values of entrepreneurial productivity. However that would signicantly
increase the computational cost in what is already a complex model. See Castro and evµcik
7These may seem like large numbers, but they are generated by matching the wealth distribution of the
US, which is fat-tailed in part due to the presence of some highly wealthy entrepreneurs. Notably the model
matches this feature of the data even though it is not a calibration target.
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(2016) for current work along those lines. Also, as pointed out in Poschke (2013), self
employment in those environments is generally di¤erent from our notion of entrepreneurship
in the sense that many agents are self-employed out of necessity, especially in developing
countries. The notion of entrepreneurship in this paper is that of an agent who has a highly-
productive, capital-intensive idea, the implementation of which may be limited by nancing
constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background to the exercise,
motivating the model in Section 3 using a combination of background literature and a recent,
large survey of entrepreneurs. Section 4 explains the calibration process and Section 5 reports
the results of our quantitative experiments.
2 Motivation
We now provide a brief survey of the related literature that motivates our study. In addi-
tion, we provide a snapshot of entrepreneurship based on a large survey of entrepreneurs
across Europe, which provides further insight into the impact of nancing constraints on
entrepreneurship and education.
2.1 Background Literature
The determinants of entrepreneurship have been subject to extensive research. In particular,
it is well known that entrepreneurs tend to be wealthy. According to Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), under 8 percent of the workforce is made up of entrepreneurs dened as business
owners who manage their rms8 yet 54 percent of the households in the top percentile of
8This is our denition too. In our model, it is key that the human capital of the owner be a central
determinant of the prots of the rm: thus, for example, someone who manages a business but does not own
it, or who owns a business but outsources its management, is not an entrepreneur in terms of our model.
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the wealth distribution are entrepreneurs.
An extensive literature nds that entrepreneurs tend to be wealthy, including Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Blanchower and Oswald (1998), Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006, 2009). Independently, the empirical literature regularly nds that
educational is linked to entrepreneurship however, this link has received much less attention.
Mondragón-Vélez (2009) documents that among entrepreneurs, 41% have college education
or higher, while only 29% among the general population have attended college. Bates (1990)
nds that the probability of rm survival is higher if the entrepreneur has completed college.
Terajima (2006) nds that the earnings of college educated entrepreneurs between 1983 and
2001 was 2:3 times higher than the earnings of non-college educated entrepreneurs.
This raises two questions. First, are educated entrepreneurs more successful than the
uneducated because education increases their productivity, or simply because they are more
wealthy? Since the labor market rewards education, educated entrepreneurs might be more
successful simply because they accumulate wealth more rapidly, not because they are better
entrepreneurs. Notably, Diaz-Jimenez et al (1997) nd that the college-educated are 2:6
times as wealthy as the high-school educated.
Second, it is well known that for some the ability to attend college is limited by wealth 
see Becker (1975), as well as more recent work such as Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011).
Human capital acquired through education is inalienable: as a result, default on an educa-
tional loan tends to trigger a harsh punishment regime, including temporary exclusion from
capital markets and wage garnishment (Ionescu (2009, 2011)), but the human capital itself
cannot be retrieved.
If the educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs, but education can be limited by
nancing constraints, then nancing constraints could in fact limit the number of entrepre-
neurs in the economy because many agents do not attain the college education that would
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have increased their likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs in the rst place. Conversely, it
could be that the college educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs simply because only
the wealthy can become college educated in the rst place something which will depend
on the extent of government aid to students with nancial need. Resolving these questions
is important for understanding the incentives to go to college, the determinants of entrepre-
neurship, and the implications of policy in support of education or entrepreneurship. Related
quantitative work such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) that studies the role of nance and
entrepreneurship in inequality is unable to address these questions, because those models do
not include an education decision. Terajima (2006) does include an education decision, but
educational choice in his model is not subject to nancing constraints.
2.2 A snapshot of entrepreneurship
In addition to the data provided in the literature, we draw upon the 2005 Factors of Business
Success survey conducted by the European Commission. Covering about 338; 000 entrepre-
neurs across Europe, this survey provides a unique opportunity to establish certain stylized
facts about the link between entrepreneurship, college education and nance. While we use
data to calibrate our model from the US, Europe has a broadly similar level of development
as the US. Moreover, while countries in Europe are very open to cross-border nancial ows,
they have very di¤erent regimes for nancial support for college education, which allows us
to further exploit cross-country variation in education nance regimes to learn more about
these links. We measure it using the World Bank 1998-2012 share of GDP of government
support per student in tertiary education.
1. Entrepreneurship is a state, not a type. Across the EU, only about 16% of
new entrepreneurs surveyed mentioned managing another enterprise as their previous
activity (as opposed to being an employee, student, or unemployed). See Table 1.
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This rises to 19% for people with some form of tertiary education  either because
entrepreneurial opportunities come along more often, or because they are better able
to take advantage of them. See Table 2. On the other hand 81% of entrepreneurs report
that their plan for the future is to continue with the enterprise: entrepreneurship is a
persistent state. Finally, 73% of respondents report the prospect of a higher income
as a primary reason for becoming an entrepreneur: agents pursue entrepreneurship if
and when it is protable.
2. Entrepreneurship is largely an individual activity. the vast majority of entre-
preneurs (82%) report that they are the sole manager. Thus, the human capital of the
entrepreneur will be a critical input into the success or failure of the business. Also
68% of respondents report that they have no other current gainful activity: entrepre-
neurship is a full time job. See Table 1.
3. Self-nance is critical for entrepreneurs. Fully 85% of entrepreneurs reported
self-nancing as a key source of funds for their enterprise 85% of the uneducated and
88% of the educated. Interestingly, bank loans are less important for more educated
entrepreneurs, suggesting that their ability to self-nance is more likely to be su¢ cient.
This is consistent with the educated being wealthier: indeed the di¢ culty of nancing
as an obstacle to entrepreneurship is decreasing in education also. See Tables 1 and 2.
4. Financing constraints are a common problem constraining entrepreneurs.
Many entrepreneurs, at least 41%, report some kind of nancing constraint as being
a serious impediment to their business activity, and more than half report that the
highest priority if prots increase is to invest in the business. In Table 1 only about
a quarter indicate that paying o¤ loans is the highest priority (and in Table 2 the
college-educated report this less often).
5. Scale is constrained in terms of capital, not employment. Only 24% of re-
spondents say that expanding employment is a priority if earnings increase. Also, only
10
15% report expansion of employment as the expected development of the business
activity.
6. The educated do not operate projects with larger target size, or are better
able to overcome nancing constraints, or both. If the educated were dispro-
portionately productive, we would expect educated entrepreneurs to report either that
they are more constrained by their personal wealth or more dependent on external
nance due to larger target size unless they are disproportionately wealthy, which
would only matter in an environment where nancing constraints are important. The
survey data do not have property. The college educated report that paying o¤ loans
is a high priority less often than the uneducated, indicating that they are better able
to self-nance and/or do not obviously require disproportionate quantities of external
funds to realize their projects. Also, the rate at which entrepreneurs report that busi-
ness expansion is their priority if earnings increase does not vary by education. This is
something our calibration will explore later, but the data do not obviously indicate that
the educated typically have projects of average larger size. Of course, as mentioned
it could be that the college-educated do have larger target sizes, but their wealth is
greater so they do not experience any particular di¢ culty in attaining it. However,
then we might expect the college educated to be more likely to report higher income
as the motivation behind their pursuit of entrepreneurship: the reverse is true.
7. Support for college nance is correlated with looser nancing constraints on
entrepreneurs, and higher protability. Table 3 reports that in countries where
college is subsidized entrepreneurs report fewer di¢ culties raising funds from external
sources.9 They also clearly report higher protability. Interestingly these responses are
related to greater access to bank loans by all entrepreneurs, not just the educated. This
suggests that there is some spillover from subsidized college to all potential entepreneurs
9Although we do not have many countries in the survey (14 or 15 depending on the question), we can
still extract suggestive evidence from cross-country variation in the survey responses.
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Table 1: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey. Values correspond
to the share of respondents who answered "yes".
Survey question % respondents
Start-up nancing - own funds or savings 0.85
Start-up nancing - bank loan without collateral 0.07
Start-up nancing - bank loan with collateral 0.11
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing 0.55
Previous occupation - employee 0.56
Other current gainful activity - no 0.68
Current management - alone 0.82
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of bank loans 0.41
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of risk capital 0.31
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of short term credit 0.36
Highest priority if earnings increase - invest in the activity of the enterprise 0.54
Highest priority if earnings increase - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.26
Highest priority if earnings increase - hire more employees 0.24
Expected development of the business activity - hire more employees 0.15
Start-up motivation - prospect of making more money 0.73
Strategic plans - continuing the enterprise 0.81
Expected development of business activity - increase of number of employees 0.15
in the economy, for example through the creation of a greater pool of wealth from which
any entrepreneur might draw. On the other hand, the overall share of GDP spent on
education is not signicantly related to these responses unlike the extent of support
for college. Most interestingly, nor is the market capitalization of domestic rms as
a share of GDP, nor the ratio of private credit to GDP, both standard indicators of
nancial development (see Rajan and Zingales (1998) for example).10 Thus, support
for college is not a proxy for local nancial development.
In what follows we develop a model of college and entrepreneurship that captures the
features underlined above, and we explore the impact of education policy in the model.
10All these country variables are measured using data from the World Bank WDI database.
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Table 2: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey - college vs. non-
college respondents. Values correspond to the share of respondents who answered "yes".
Survey question No college College
Start-up nancing - own funds or savings 0.849 0.877
Start-up nancing - bank loan without collateral 0.072 0.053
Start-up nancing - bank loan with collateral 0.122 0.081
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing 0.576 0.460
Start-up motivation - prospect of making more money 0.738 0.685
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of bank loans 0.439 0.304
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of risk capital 0.333 0.240
Impediments to developing the business activity - availability of short term credit 0.377 0.277
Highest priority if earnings increase - invest in the activity of the enterprise 0.537 0.546
Highest priority if earnings increase - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.285 0.180
Start-up motivation - prospect of making more money 0.738 0.685
Strategic plans - continuing the enterprise 0.817 0.805
Table 3: Selected responses to the 2005 Factors of Business Success survey. Values correspond
to the cross-country correlation between the share of respondents who answered "yes" and
country level measures. Coll. sup. is government support for each college student as a share
of GDP. Ed. sup. is the share of GDP devoted to government support for education. CAP
is the market capitalization of publicly traded rms as a share of GDP. CRED is private
credit as a share of GDP. One and two asterisks represent statistical signicance at the ve
and one percent levels respectively. Source: Eurostat or WDI.
Sample College sample Full sample
Survey question Coll. sup. Coll. sup. Ed. sup. CAP CRED
Start-up nancing - bank loan without coll. 0.790** 0.809** 0.305 0.168 0.240
Start-up nancing - bank loan with coll. 0.560* 0.685* 0.305 0.614* 0.554*
Start-up di¢ culties - to get nancing -0.766** -0.766** -0.462 -0.437 -0.253
Judgement of protability - very good 0.906** 0.899** 0.287 0.375 0.333
Judgement of protability - good 0.679* 0.793** 0.208 0.418 0.465
Judgement of protability - barely suf. -0.636* -0.676** 0.135 -0.200 -0.258
Judgement of protability - poor -0.578* -0.692** -0.493 -0.447 -0.395
Highest priority - invest in the enterprise -0.452 -0.384 0.433 -0.029 -0.345
Highest priority - pay o¤ loans or credits 0.102 0.255 -0.154 0.377 0.484
Expected development - increase prots -0.331 -0.233 0.531* -0.163 -0.448
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3 Model Economy
We present a general equilibrium model where households choose whether to work or to
become entrepreneurs, based on their expected earnings in either activity. These earnings
are a function of idiosyncratic productivity shocks and of their capital (wealth). There is
incomplete insurance, in that the only way agents may insure against idiosyncratic shocks
is by holding capital, as in Aiyagari (1994). Entrepreneurs may use their capital to produce
themselves, rather than renting it to other agents. Entrepreneurs may also produce using
borrowed capital: however, the extent to which they are able to borrow capital is limited by
an imperfect enforcement problem. If entrepreneurs refuse to repay their loans, then only a
fraction f of their prots and remaining capital may be garnished.11 Thus, in equilibrium
agents may only borrow capital up to the point that they are indi¤erent between repaying
and reneging. This inability to obtain the rst-best level of capital from external sources
is what provides entrepreneurs with an incentive to amass wealth. The model builds on a
standard approach to modeling entrepreneurs under nancing constraints, extended to allow
for college entrepreneurs in a way consistent with the above empirical observations.
When born, agents choose an education level e  0, at a cost. Agents may borrow
to become educated: however, like entrepreneurs, they may renege on repayment. Human
capital is inalienable, so there is no way to reduce the agents chosen value of e if they default.
Instead, they are excluded from credit markets for a period of time, during which a share
 of their wages may be garnished. This follows the treatment of defaulted college loans
documented in Ionescu (2008, 2009 and 2011). If for a given value of e the agent cannot
a¤ord education on her own but would default if she were to borrow, then that level of e
is ruled out of the agents choice set. As a result, agents have an incentive to accumulate
savings so that their o¤spring may be less limited in their educational choices.
11See Quadrini (2000), Cooley et al. (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) and Buera et al (2011)
for similar constraints.
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An important element of the model will be state support of education. This is because we
calibrate the economy to data for the United States, where there is extensive state support
for college education.
3.1 Technology
There are two sectors in the economy: entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial. The non-
entrepreneurial sector represents large publicly traded rms.12 It operates the standard
constant-returns technology:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t (1)
where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is labor and A is a productivity term.
Entrepreneurial rms are run by a single entrepreneur who operates the technology:
Y nt = xtk
v
t ; 0 <  < 1. (2)
Here Y nt is output and kt is capital input. The variable xt is an idiosyncratic productivity
term, and it summarizes all economic or psychological factors that might determine the
availability or productivity of entrepreneurial opportunities. As discussed later, the choice
of kt may be limited by a borrowing constraint.13
12See Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) for similar models.
13We do not allow entrepreneurs to hire workers for several reasons. First, the survey data indicate that
expansion of employment is neither a priority nor an expected outcome of the business.the rm is larger for
the educated, one would expect them to report expansion of the business as being a priority more often.
Second, this maintains the focus of our work on the accumulation of physical/nancial capital, which both
the literature and the survey data indicate is the main priority of entrepreneurs.
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3.2 Households
There is a continuum of agents in discrete time. Each period a mass of agents called New-
bornsenters the model. Newborns start life with a wealth inheritance, choosing their level
of education e  0. The following period they become Young.The young face a constant
probability of remaining young, y, whereas with probability 1  y they become Old.in
turn, old agents face a probability o of remaining old, whereas with probability 1  o they
leave the model. When old agents exit the model, they are each replaced by a newborn, who
inherits the old agents assets. We normalize the population to equal one.
Regardless of age, agents maximize expected discounted utility. Their instantaneous
utility function is u(c) = c
1 
1  ,  > 1, and their discount factor is . Each period agents are
endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically if they are workers. Agents
who choose to be entrepreneurs use up their labor managing the rm.
At each point in time, agents have two state variables, xt and yt. The variable xt is
the agents entrepreneurial ability and yt is their labor market earnings ability, net of any
education premia. These two states follow independent Markov processes: yt~F y (ytjyt 1; e)
and xt~F x (xtjxt 1; e). Notice that the Markov process governing the evolution of xt may
depend on the educational level e. Mondragón-Vélez (2009) report that the college-educated
form a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs, and Terajima (2006) reports that college
educated entrepreneurs are more protable. On the other hand, our survey data did not
obviously suggest that entrepreneurs are signicantly more productive if they also have
college. We wish to establish whether this is because the college-educated are more likely
to have higher values of xt, or because the college-educated tend to be wealthier and thus
less nancially-constrained. In addition, the process for yt may also depend on education,
capturing the well-known nding that more educated agents tend to have higher labor market
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earnings.14 If x is too low, the enterprise is closed and the agent returns to the labor market.
There are incomplete markets: agents may self-insure against di¤erent forms of idiosyn-
cratic risk via holdings at of nancial assets, which are claims on physical capital. Capital
pays net interest rate r and depreciates at rate .
3.2.1 Young agents
Each period, young agents choose whether to be entrepreneurs or workers. Young entrepre-
neurs use the technology (2) to generate income, using their own capital or borrowing capital
from other agents. They also earn income from capital they lend to other agents. With their
income they purchase consumption ct, and assets at+1 for next period.
A young entrepreneur has the value function
V n (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1;kt
fu (ct) + yEV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e) (3)
+ (1  y) EW (at+1; xt+1; e)g
s:t:
ct + at+1  xtkt + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)
kt  0; at  0
Borrowing constraint (4) , see below
where V is the young agents expected value in the future if they remain young, to be
explained below, and W is their expected value in the future if they become old, to be
discussed below. The expectation E is taken with respect to xt+1 and yt+1, the idiosyncratic
14As in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) we allow the processes for x and y to evolve independently. We show
in the Appendix that the key features of the calibration are not sensitive to this assumption.
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entrepreneurial and labor market productivity shocks respectively. Note that the distribution
of xt+1 and yt+1 depends on e: for example, the well-known presence of a college wage
premium would imply that the distribution for F x among the more educated rst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of F x among the less-educated. Thus, although we
use the notation E to denote expectations for xt+1 and yt+1 with simple notation, the reader
should remember that the expectation is conditional on current values of xt and yt as well
as e.
Entrepreneurs are also subject to a borrowing constraint. If kt  at > 0 then the agent is
borrowing and must pay (1 + r) (kt   at) to other agents. If the agent refuses to make this
repayment, they are punished by the garnishment of a fraction f of their prots and their
holdings of undepreciated capital, f [xtkt + (1  )kt].
Along the equilibrium path agents will not default. However, the fact that they could
default introduces an incentive compatibility constraint that can limit the extent to which
rms can borrow.15 This constraint compares the value of repaying V n (at; xt; yt; e) with the
value of default, including the possibility that agents might choose di¤erent values of at+1
o¤ the equilibrium path. However, Buera et al (2011) show that the incentive compatibility
constraint takes the simple form
xtk

t + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)  (1  f) [xtkt + (1  )kt] (4)
In other words, what matters is whether or not the prots from default are higher now.16
15In some models e.g. Evans and Jovanovic (1989), the nancing constraint takes the form of a simple
factor of wealth. However, Parker and van Praag (2006) nd that the extent to which rms are nancially
constrained appears to depend not just on wealth but also on education, indicating that such a constraint
is not appropriate in this context. This suggests a model such as Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) or
Buera et al (2011) where nancing constraints are due to a limited enforcement problem, whereby agents
may default on their debts. In this case, agentsnancing constraints will depend endogenously on their
wealth but also on their level of education, since it a¤ects both the protability of entrepreneurship and the
foregone income if they default and are punished. A model like this is also less subject to the Lucas Critique.
16The value function V () is strictly increasing in at, and with higher income agents can attain both higher
consumption and higher savings at+1. Thus, the value of default is higher than that of repayment if and
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If the unconstrained optimal capital usage violates this constraint, then the agent will only
be able to use the level of capital kt such that equation (4) holds with equality, or such that
kt = at, whichever is larger.
If the young agent chooses to be a worker, her value is
V w (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1
fu (ct) + yEV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e) (5)
+ (1  y) EW r (at+1; xt+1; e)g
s:t:
at+1  (1  )wyt + at (1 + r)  ct
where w is the wage and yt is her labor productivity shock and  is the labor income tax
rate,17 and where the expectation is conditional on xt+1, yt+1 and e. If the worker ages she
retires, earning value W r to be described below.
Finally, the agent chooses her occupation optimally. As a result, her value function V is
V (at; xt; yt; e) = max fV n (at; xt; yt; e) ; V w (at; xt; yt; e)g : (6)
3.2.2 Old agents
Most old agents simply retire. The value for a retiree is W r, where
only if the current prots from default exceed those from repayment.
17As in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), we do not tax entrepreneurs, consistent with the generally lower
capital than labor taxes in the US. See Section 5 for a discussion.
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W r (at) = max
ct;at+1
fu (ct) + oW r (at+1) + (1  o)EV new (at+1; xt+1; yt+1)g (7)
s:t:
at+1  at (1 + r)  ct + p
Here, p is a social security payment. Recall that with probability o the agent exits the model
and is replaced by a newborn. The function V new is the value function for the newborn.
Young entrepreneurs who become old may choose to continue running their rms, if they
prefer not to retire, capturing the fact that entrepreneurs do sometimes continue operating
their rms well into old age. In that case they may become old entrepreneurs, whose value
W e is given by:
W e (at; xt; e) = max fu (ct) + oEW (at+1; xt+1; e) (8)
+(1  o)EV new (at+1; xt+1; yt+1)g
s:t:
at+1  xtkvt + (1  ) kt   (1 + r) (kt   at)  ct
kt  0; at  0
Borrowing constraint (4) :
where o 2 (0; 1) is the probability of remaining old. As in Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), the expected value of the newborns value function is taken with respect to the
invariant distribution of yt, and their value of xt follows the usual Markov process based on
the newborns parents value of xt 1 and e. This allows agents to potentially inherit their
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parentsrms a feature we introduce into the model due to the well known tendency of
entrepreneurship to run in families, see Blanchower (2009).
Newborn agents observe their initial values of xt and yt, and decide on their educational
level. The initial value of yt is drawn from the ergodic distribution of F y for the uneducated,
so agents do not inherit labor market conditions.
Finally, the old chose whether to retire or (if they have a rm) to continue it:
W (at; xt; e) = max fW e (at; xt; e) ;W r (at)g : (9)
3.2.3 The Newborn
If newborns choose not to become educated, they are identical to young agents for whom
e = 0, choosing whether to be workers or entrepreneurs. If they choose e > 0, they may work
but they may not become entrepreneurs. This is for theoretical reasons18, but is also not
restrictive in that entrepreneurship rates are close to zero for people of college age and a few
years beyond, see Stangler and Spulber (2013). In this case, they must also pay an education
cost  (e; ), where  (0; ) = 0, e (e; ) > 0 and  (e; ) > 0.  is a random variable that
a¤ects the cost of education for a given agent, drawn from a distribution F . We introduce
 because later, in our calibration, we will have few values of e, so allowing for some noise
in the cost of education will ensure that educational decisions are not too lumpy in our
simulations.19 Our model contains the typical assumption that agents decide on whether or
18If we allow the newly-educated to be entrepreneurs then there will be two nancing constraints facing
certain entrepreneurs, one related to rm size and one related to education, and it would be di¢ cult to
specify what occurs if the agent defaults on one type of loan but not the other. Since the very young are
unlikely to be entrepreneurs (in the calibrated economy entrepreneurs are under 8 percent of the population
and current college students are about 1 percent), we simply assume the newborns may not be entrepreneurs.
19For example, if we let e 2 f0; 1g where e = 1 represents going to college, then  can be thought as
representing the fact that the college application process is uncertain and that there is variation in the cost
across universities (due to di¤erent tuition costs, cost of living di¤erences, etc).
21
not to go to college based on their ability and the relative payo¤ from doing so, as in for
example Jones and Yang (2016). Our model di¤ers from the prior literature on education in
that "ability" is 2-dimensional, encompassing the initial values of both xt and yt. In addition,
we di¤er from most of the prior literature in allowing education to a¤ect the productivity of
work and the productivity of entrepreneurship to di¤erent degrees.20
To attain level of education e, agents may receive governmental support s (e; ; a). The
function s depends on the level of education e, its cost draw  and the agents wealth a.
Allowing for support s () will be important because it a¤ects the education-wealth link.
The value of an uneducated newborn V noneduc (at; xt; yt) is:
V noneduc (at; xt; yt) = maxfV n (at; xt; yt; 0) ; V w (at; xt; yt; 0)g
= V (at; xt; yt; 0)
where V nand V w are the value functions for entrepreneurs and workers respectively, as
dened earlier.
For educated newborn agents, the value V educ (at; xt; yt; e; ) is:
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; ) = max
c;a0
fu (ct) + EV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e)g
s:t:
at+1  (1  )wtyt + (at    (e; ) + s (e; ; at)) (1 + r)  ct
20An exception is the model of Xiang and Yeaple (2016) where there are two types of human capital,
as here (analytical and "leadership", the latter being linked to entrepreneurship), each of which may be
enhanced by education to a di¤erent degree.
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Notice that if  (e; )   s (e; ; at) > at for any given level of e and  then agents must
borrow  (e; )   s (e; ; at)   at. In addition, subsidized loans may constitute part of the
subsidy scheme s.21 In order to borrow, agents must satisfy an incentive compatibility
constraint, otherwise they would default. If an agent defaults on an education loan then
she enters a punishment regime where she earns value Deduc (at; xt; yt; e). While being
punished the agent is barred from capital markets and from entrepreneurship, and there is
a wage garnishment rate  (e), as well as a probability  (e) that the agent will be forgiven
so the punishment regime ends. Thus we have that
Deduc (at; xt; yt; e) = max
ct;at+1
8><>: u (ct) + y[(1   (e))ED
educ (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e) +
 (e)EV (at+1; xt+1; yt+1; e)] + (1  y)W r (at+1)
9>=>;
s:t:
at+1  (1 + r) at + (1   (e)) (1  )wtyt   ct
If the agent is forgiven, from then on she can choose occupations and borrow as a normal
young agent. If the agent is still unforgiven when she becomes old, she retires.
Since at the moment of default the agent would have no assets (having spent them on
education), the incentive compatibility constraint is
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )  Deduc (0; xt; yt; e) :
If for given values of e and  this constraint is not satised, then the agent cannot attain
level of education e. Agents choose optimally their education e among the feasible set that
21For example, suppose that s1 is a system of grants and subsidies, whereas s2 is a rate of loan subsi-
dization up to a threshold L (like subsidized Sta¤ord loans in the US). Then, s (e; ; at) = s1 (e; ; at) +
min (L;max f0;  (e; )  s1 (e; ; at)  atg)
s2 (e; ; at) r. If the interest rate is lowered by a proportion &, then we have that s2 (e; ; at) = &:
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is not ruled out by credit constraints, conditional on x and y. In the calibrated economy
we will nd that y and e are positively related, consistent with the nding that agents with
higher earnings potential (e.g. IQ) are more likely to be educated, as found by Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2011) among others.
Finally, dene V educ (at; xt; yt; 0; )  V noneduc (at; xt; yt). The value of a newborn is
then:22
V new (at; xt; yt) =
Z
max
e2
V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )gdF  ()
 =

e : V educ (at; xt; yt; e; )  Deduc (0; xt; yt; e)
	
where  is the set of educational levels that is not ruled out by the incentive compatibility
constraint.
There is no childhood in the model: as in the related literature, we focus on the part
of the lifecycle during which agents are economically active. We also collapse college into
one period. Having 4 periods would allow students to drop out of college before completion:
however, this is not central to our topic of interest as the entrepreneurial returns to college
jump up for agents who completed college, see Mondragón-Vélez (2009).
3.3 Equilibrium
Let !t be the aggregate state variable, the measure over di¤erent types of agents. The
measure !t is dened over the quintuple (a; x; y; e; g): the agents asset holdings, a, entre-
preneurial productivity x, labor market productivity y, education level e, and a variable
22Notice that since  (0; ) = 0,  6= ?, so as long as there are nite values of e or the choice of e is compact
the problem of educational choice will have a solution.
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g 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g which indicates the agents life cycle stage: agents are classied as newborn,
young, old entrepreneurs or retirees. The measure !t 2 X is an element of the set X; where
X = R4+f1; 2; 3; 4g. There is a transition mapping   : X ! X, so that !t+1 =   (!t). The
mapping   is a function of agents optimal decision rules regarding savings, education and
occupational choice, as well as the stochastic processes for x, y,  and ageing.
Denition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a wage w, an interest rate r, a tax rate  and a
measure ! such that:
 Young agents consumption, investment, capital use and occupational choices are opti-
mal, solving problems (3), (5) and (6), subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
on entrepreneurs.
 Old agents consumption, investment, capital use and occupational choices are opti-
mal, solving problems (7) and (8), subject to the incentive compatibility constraint on
entrepreneurs.
 Labor markets clear: total labor supply from workers equals the labor demand from the
nonentrepreneurial sector.
 Capital markets clear: total capital supply from all agents savings equals capital de-
mand from both entrepreneurial and nonentrepreneurial sectors.
 The government budget is in balance: total tax receipts equal total social security trans-
fers to retirees as well as total education support to newborns.
 The distribution of agents is invariant: ! =   (!).
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4 Calibration
We need to calibrate the parameters , , , , y, o, , p, v, f , ,  as well as the functions
s, , F y and F x. We choose one year as our period length.
We try to x as many parameters as possible and calibrate the remaining parameters to
match various statistics regarding education, entrepreneurship and inequality in the US. The
depreciation rate of capital  is 6% as in Stokey and Rebelo (1995). The coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion  is 1:5; from Attanasio et al. (1999). Productivity in the non-entrepreneurial
sector is normalized to 1. The share of capital in the aggregate production function  is 0:33,
as in Gollin (2002). The probabilities of being young and old are chosen to yield an average
working life of 45 years and an average retirement period of 11 years. The discount factor 
is calibrated to match capital to output ratio of 3:3 as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). See
Tables 4 and 5.
We use a parsimonious specication for entrepreneurship, setting x to equal either zero
or a positive value that depends on the level of education: x 2 f0;  (e) xhighg, xhigh > 0.
Parameter xhigh is the productivity of an uneducated entrepreneur, and  (e) is a premium
that an educated entrepreneur might have over that. Thus  (0) = 1.  (e) > 1 means that a
potential entrepreneur with education level e has more productive ideas than an uneducated
agent.  (e) < 1 means that the opposite is the case.
This way, as in much of the related literature, agents either do or do not have an entrepre-
neurial opportunity.23 Note, however, that it is not necessarily the case that all entrepreneurs
23Poschke (2013) observes that about 12 percent of the self-employed in the US do so "out of necessity."
We could introduce such agents into our model by having more values of x < xhigh. However this would
signicantly increase the computational cost. In addition, those agents would have small scale and any
nancing constraints on their operations would be of little consequence for aggregate savings behavior. Thus
we follow the approach of Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and focus on the high-ability entrepreneurs who
do not start enterprises "out of necessity." The Poschke (2013) denition of an entrepreneur is broader and
the number is larger do we do not view an adjustment to the Cagetti an De Nardi(2006) targets as being
necessary.
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have the same target level of capital in equilibrium, since entrepreneurial productivity may
depend on education e. The calibration process will establish the empirically reasonable
values of the entrepreneurial education premium  () :
We set the set of education values e 2 f0; 1g, interpreting e = 1 as a college education. We
do this because Mondragón-Vélez (2009) nds that the probability of being an entrepreneur
rises signicantly with college attendance, whereas Bates (1990) nds that the probability
of rm exit drops signicantly if the entrepreneur has a college degree. Thus it does not
seem useful to allow e to be dened more nely, while this would signicantly increase the
computational cost.
To select xhigh, we must establish the empirical counterpart of our notion of an entre-
preneur. In our model, the entrepreneur owns and manages her own business, such that her
human capital in the form of her entrepreneurial productivity x and her education e is key
to the protability of the enterprise. As a result, we consider an entrepreneur to be someone
who is both self employed and actively involved in the running of the enterprise. The Survey
of Consumer Finance contains an employee category of self employedand also business
owner with an active management role.As in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), we consider
people who satisfy both criteria to constitute the empirical counterpart of an entrepreneur
in our model. We calibrate xhigh to match a share of entrepreneurs of 0:0755, as in Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006). The college premium for entrepreneurs  (1) is calibrated to target
average earnings of college educated entrepreneurs over the non-college educated, as reported
in Terajima (2006), which is 2:3. We use Terajima (2006) as it is the only source, to our
knowledge, which reports this and related statistics about college-educated entrepreneurs
over a prolonged time frame (1983-2001).
The transition matrix F x is a 2  2  2 tensor, since we allow the Markov process
governing the evolution of xt to depend on e. This requires in principle four parameters:
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one each for the probability into and out of entrepreneurship for each level of e.24 Thus,264 1  in out
in 1  out
375 
 [1; 0] for non-college educated, and
264 1  inin outout
inin 1  outout
375 

[0; 1] for college educated.
We proceed as follows. First, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) nd an exit rate among
entrepreneurs of 0:206 in PSID. Bates (1990) reports a logit regression that indicates how
the probability of survival varies when an agent earns a college degree. We choose the
probabilities of rm survival to match the mean from Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and the
di¤erences from Bates (1990) (see Appendix for details). This pins down values for out and
out, leaving us to calibrate in and in.
The parameter in is the probability that an uneducated worker with x = 0 has an
entrepreneurial draw of x = xhigh and the parameter in is the extent to which the educated
are more likely to have a draw of x = xhigh. in = 1 implies that the probability of a
draw of x = xhigh is equal for workers regardless of education. To match hazard rates into
entrepreneurship for college and non-college groups we match two statistics. One is the ow
rate of workers into entrepreneurship, which Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) report to be 2:3
percent. The other is the share of entrepreneurs with a college education, which is 41 percent
in Mondragón-Vélez (2009).
We dene F y (y0jy; 0)  F y (y0jy) as the baseline distribution of shocks to labor income.
Then we set F y (  y0jy; 1) = F y (y0jy),   1. In words, there exists a college wage
premium  such that the distribution of labor income shocks for the college-educated rst-
order stochastically dominates that for the uneducated. This specication is useful because
the function  () can be calibrated to match the well-known college earnings premium. At
the same time, there will be signicant variation in labor market outcomes across agents with
24The probability of remaining an entrepreneur for each education group is one minus the probability of
going out of entrepreneurship, and the probability of remaining a worker is one minus the probability of
going into entrepreneurship. Thus, with these 4 parameters, the entire tensor is determined.
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Table 4: Parameters of The Model
A. Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value
 1:5 Attanasio et al. (1999)
 6% Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
 0:33 Gollin (2002)
A 1 Normalization
y 0:978 see text
o 0:911 see text
 1=7
 (1) 0:15
 1:4 Fang (2006)
B. Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Calibrated value
p 40% of GDP Kotliko¤, et al (1999)
v 0:926
x [0 0:448]
F x see text
 0:8706
F y see text
f 0:4083
(1; ) [3:29 3:47 3:65 3:84 4:02]
 (e) [1 1]
y [0:29 0:48 0:79 1:30 2:14]
s () see text
Table 5: Parameters of The Model
Parameter Matched moments
p Transfer size as share of GDP
v Gini coe¢ cient of wealth
x % of entrepreneurs in the whole work force
F x ow of workers into entrepreneurship (%), share of college educated entrepreneurs
 capital to GDP ratio
F y Gini coe¢ cient of earnings
f median net worth of entrepreneurs vs whole population
(1; ) percentage of college educated population
 (e) average earnings of college vs. non-college educated entreps
s () share of agents in state college (see text)
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the same value of e, due to the realizations of y. We set the college premium for workers 
to equal the estimate of 1:4 in Fang (2006). Fang (2006) considers that the observed college
premium combines the fact that worker productivity may rise as a result of earning a college
education, but that it could also be that college simply provides a signal to employers about
worker ability, or that higher ability agents are more likely to attend college. The estimate
of 1:4 refers to the productivity increase from going to college, net of any signalling and
selection e¤ects, which is exactly our parameter . In our context, this corresponds to the
idea that newborns choose whether or not to go to college based on their values of x and y,
so the unconditional average college premium in the model may also not accurately reect
the productivity increase that comes from going to college. Because of these selection e¤ects,
assuming that  = 1:4, we nd that the average wage of a college graduate in our model is
1:9 times higher than that of the average worker without college, underlining the importance
of the endogeneity of the college attendance decision. Indeed, over 1983-2001, Terajima
(2006) reports that in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) the ratio of average earnings
of college educated vs. non-college educated workers is precisely 1:9. Thus our model is able
to account for the observed unconditional educational premium based on self-selection amd
credit constraints.
To match the earnings process F y (y0jy), we set log yt = log yt 1 + "t where the error is
normally distributed, and set the variance of "t to match the Gini of earnings to be 0:4 as
in the PSID data.25 We approximate it over a grid of ve values of y, so that log y = [ 1,
 0:5, 0, 0:5, 1].
25We write the process F y as a random walk  as opposed to a mean-reverting process  for several
reasons. First, the persistence of the income process is known to be very high. Second, in practice, since
labor productivity yt is drawn from a nite number of values, the actual calibrated process will be mean-
reverting. Adding a persistence parameter is not going to change the F y matrix much and the fact that the
matrix is bounded means it already satises that feature: the fact of having a nite number of values of y
itself introduces some persistence. In fact, if we generate a long series of values for y and estimate an AR1
process for y the persistence value that emerges is 86 percent. The literature di¤ers on the value of this
parameter but a typical range of estimates is between 0:82 (Guvenenen 2009) and 0:95 (Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron 2004) depending on the details of the specication so we fall well in that range in practice.
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We set the social security transfer p to match a ratio of social security transfers to
GDP of 40%, as in Kotliko¤ et al (1999). The degree of decreasing returns to scale in
the entrepreneurial production v is set to match a Gini coe¢ cient of wealth26 of 0:8. The
entrepreneurial punishment parameter f is calibrated to match the ratio of the median net
worth of entrepreneurs compared to the whole population, which Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006) report to equal 0:3.
Finally we discuss the structure of the education costs  (), the education nancing
scheme s (), and the punishment strategy for default on educational loans.
The education cost (e; ) is uniformly distributed over ve values. We set the mean cost
to match the share of educated agents in the population. This is 0:29 in the PSID according
to Mondragón-Vélez (2009). The other values are set to cover uniformly the range plus or
minus 10% of the mean value. This provides some smoothing of the decision rules regarding
education.
The education nancing scheme s (e; ; at) is set to reproduce basic features of the United
States education nancing system. This is built on the following pillars:
1. The existence of state colleges, which are subsidized relative to private colleges
2. grants, such as Pell grants, up to a certain limit and contingent on household assets.
3. subsidized loans, also up to a certain limit and contingent on household assets.
First we capture the existence of state colleges by assuming that some agents receive a
subsidy that covers a certain proportion of the education cost  (1; ). This proportion is set
equal to 0:57. We arrive at this value by noting that the US Department of Education Fast
26We nd a value of v = 0:926. This implies that in the calibrated economy 3:9 percent of income accrues
to entrepreneurs. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) nd that the corresponding value in US data is 3:3 percent,
very close.
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Facts 2013reports that the ratio of the cost of public vs private college is 0:43. We assume
furthermore that the purpose of state support s () is to reduce the link between wealth and
the ability to go to college. As such, we assume that only agents below a certain wealth
threshold are allowed to go to state colleges. We choose this threshold to match the share
of agents who go to state college and pay state tuition, which is 0:5.27 This threshold turns
out to be about ve times GDP per capita. This is a reasonable value. Consider that in
the United States the mean age of rst birth for a woman is in the mid 20s, and for men is
slightly higher. This means that households who are sending their children to college tend
to be in their mid-40s at the earliest. The Census Bureau28 reports that in 2007 the median
wealth of households with a head of household in the age range 45-54 in this group was 3:5
times GDP, and the mean wealth was 12 times GDP.
Next, we calibrate grants. First, the need-based grant system in the United States implies
an expected contribution of at least 20% of assets each year.29. Over 4 years that accumulates
to 0:59 times the agents assets. There is also an upper bound on grants of $5; 645, which
turns out to be 17% of the cost of attending a private college in 2013 (US Department of
Education Fast Facts 2013). Thus, all agents (regardless of whether or not they attend a
public institution) are allowed a grant of up to the smallest of 17 percent of the mean value
of the college cost  (1; ) or 1  0:59 of their assets.
Last, we calibrate subsidized loans by assuming that interest on loans is subsidized so
that the interest rate is half the market rate. This is based on the treatment of subsidized vs.
unsubsidized Sta¤ord loans.30 This is up to a limit of about $5; 000 for 2013, which is about
15% of the annual private college cost. Similarly, in the model we assume that agents may
27The Department of Education reports that 59 percent of college students attended public institutions,
whereas according to Wintergreen Orchard House (an educational database compiler) the median share of out
of state students at public universities is 14 percent, see http://www.collegexpress.com/lists/list/percentage-
of-out-of-state-students-at-public-universities/360/, last checked 8/28/14.
28See http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0720.xls, last checked 8/28/14.
29See the detailed formula for computing the Expected Family Contribution at
http://ifap.ed.gov/efcformulaguide/attachments/091913EFCFormulaGuide1415.pdf, last checked 8/28/14.
30See https://studentaid.ed.gov. Last checked 09/04/14.
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Table 6: Calibration Statistics
Target Baseline Model
Transfer size as share of GDP 0:4 0:4
capital to GDP ratio 3:3 3:3
Gini coe¢ cient of wealth 0:80 0:82
% of entrepreneurs in the whole work force 7:6 7:5
median net worth of entrepreneurs vs whole population 0:3 0:3
percentage of college educated population 0:29 0:29
share of college educated entrepreneurs 0:41 0:41
ow of workers into entrepreneurship (%) 2:3 2:3
Gini coe¢ cient of earnings 0:38 0:34
average earnings of college vs. non-college educated entreps 2:3 2:3
share of agents in state college 0:5 0:5
borrow up to 15% of the college cost, assuming this does not exceed their funding through
subsidies and/or grants. Thus, in all three forms, government support for education depends
on the cost of college and on the agents wealth.
We calibrate the punishment parameters for defaulting on educational loans as follows.
The probability of being forgiven in the education loan market  = 1=7 so that defaulters
are forgiven after 7 years of punishment on average. This is the period of time for which a
default notice remains on the credit report of someone who defaults on a student loan. The
wage garnishment rate for education loan defaulters,  = 0:15, which is the limit in the US
for default on a subsidized loan. We do not distinguish in the benchmark economy between
subsidized loans and unsubsidized loans as far as the garnishment rate is concerned.
Finally, a comment on our denition of GDP in the model. We do not consider spending
on college as a component of GDP. The reason for this is that it is small (only 1 percent of
agents are newborn college attendees in any period), and because we do not want the impact
of policy on GDP to be simply due to the fact that spending on college is itself counted as
part of GDP.
We match the parameters to the desired target statistics by minimizing a loss function
(sum of squared di¤erences) using a simulated annealing algorithm  see Bertsimas and
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Tsitsiklis (1993).
5 Results
The calibration procedure matches broad statistics such as the Gini coe¢ cient of the wealth
distribution. However, the model also matches reasonably well other features of the wealth
distribution. For example, in the model, the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 83:6%
of the wealth. In the US data, according to Chang and Kim (2006), this statistic is about
80% in the SCF. Furthermore, in the model the wealthiest 1% of the population holds 40%
of the wealth. According to Wol¤ (2010), this gure has varied between 34% and 39% for
overall wealth between 1983 and 2007, and between 42% and 47% for non-home wealth. At
the other end of the wealth distribution, 10 percent of the agents in our model have zero
wealth: this is the range of 7 13% found in the SCF by Cagetti and de Nardi (2009). Thus,
our model does a good job replicating the shape of the wealth distribution, even though the
calibration process did not attempt to match anything but the Gini coe¢ cient.
There are certain other results from the calibration that are worthy of mention. In
particular, we nd that college educated entrepreneurs are no more likely than the non-
college educated to earn an entrepreneurial opportunity: in = 1. Nor are college educated
entrepreneurs more productive:  (0) =  (1) = 1. This is consistent with the "snapshot of
entrepreneurship" in Section 2. This is an important nding because it implies that, while
the educated are more likely to be entrepreneurs, and even though they tend to be more
successful, this is not because entrepreneurial opportunities or productivity are di¤erent for
them except for the hazard rate out of entrepreneurship, which is about 0:22 for agents
without college and 0:19 for the college educated (quite close). Entrepreneurship is more
protable for the educated primarily because the educated are also wealthier.
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Why might this be? Lazear (2005) nds that entrepreneurs tend to be generalists, who
have knowledge about many di¤erent aspects of management, rather than specialists. It
could be that higher education is more likely to create specialists, who may have brilliant
ideas but who may not necessarily have developed the ancillary skills to make it happen. For
example, Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) nd that leadership skills, something that could be
important for entrepreneurs, are developed in high school rather than in college, indicating
that the process that creates entrepreneurial skills and opportunities is likely independent
from whether or not agents have gone to college.
Given the importance of this nding, its robustness is important. In a calibration exercise
of this kind it is generally di¢ cult to perform statistical inference (e.g. formulating condence
intervals), since we are directly comparing the steady state of the model to moments from
the data. However, we checked for robustness in the following ways. First, we started o¤
our calibration with several di¤erent initial conditions: it eventually always converged to
these values. Second, we varied each of these parameters, individually, by 10 percent.
The parameters we varied were  (1) (the productivity of educated entrepreneurs relative to
uneducated entrepreneurs and in (the extent to which a worker is more likely to have an
entrepreneurial opportunity if she is educated). We then examined whether this signicantly
changed the match between model-generated statistics and the data.
For example, varying the productivity of educated entrepreneurs relative to the unedu-
cated  (1) by 10 percent changes the income of the educated entrepreneurs relative to the
uneducated over a range of 1:1 to 4:9, compared to the calibrated value of 2:3. These are
substantial changes in the statistic most directly a¤ected by this parameter.31 In addition,
other statistics change signicantly. The share of college educated agents in the economy
varies from 0:23 to 0:41 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:29), and the share of educated
31This is because our calibrated value of v is high, around 0:9, so small di¤erences in k can lead to large
discrepancies in returns for groups with di¤erent access to capital. If we interpret 1   v as returns to
entrepreneurship and management, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) argue that 1   v 2 [0:2; 0:1]. If we interpret
1  v to equal the returns purely to entrepreneurial activity then 1  v 2 [0:04; 0:02].
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entrepreneurs varies from 0:29 to 0:60 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:41). Thus, we
view the result that  (1) t 1 as being robust. This result also shows the sensitivity of
educational decisions to entrepreneurial returns.
Varying the probability of an entrepreneurial opportunity for the educated worker rela-
tively to the uneducated in by 10 percent changes the share of educated entrepreneurs
from 0:34 to 0:45 (compared to a calibrated value of 0:41). The overall share of college
educated agents in the economy varies from 0:26 to 0:30 (compared to a calibrated value of
0:29), and the earnings of educated entrepreneurs relative to the uneducated vary from 2:0
to 2:7. Thus, we view the result that in t 1 as being robust too.32 This result also shows
the sensitivity of educational choice to entrepreneurial opportunity.
Finally, based on the related literature, in our calibration the probability of survival of an
entrepreneurial opportunity is set to be higher for an educated entrepreneur i.e. out 6= 1. It
is worth asking whether this result is robust too: in other words, if we impose that out = 1, so
that the entrepreneurial opportunity process is identical for all agents regardless of education,
does anything change? It turns out that, if we set out = 1 and preserve the average exit rate
among entrepreneurs, the statistics matched change negligibly. We conclude that assuming
out 6= 1, as indicated by the related empirical literature, is not critical for the calibration. In
other words, F x is not signicantly di¤erent for di¤erent levels of education in terms of the
outcomes it generates for the statistics we used to calibrate the model economy. Nonetheless
we maintain the assumption that out 6= 1 in what follows, as this is what the empirical
literature indicates.
Now we compare the wealth of agents with di¤erent occupations and education levels,
see Figure 2. In the upper-left panel, entrepreneurs are in generally wealthier than workers.
The upper-right graph shows the wealth distribution of college and non-college educated
32In an earlier draft we calibrated the model to match all the relevant statistics assuming that there was no
support for education, also nding that neither the production function for entrepreneurs nor the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur were signicantly di¤erent for agents with or without college education.
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agents. College educated agents are wealthier as found by Mondragón-Vélez (2009), while the
population with zero assets are mainly the non-college educated. When comparing the wealth
levels between college educated entrepreneurs and workers (the lower-left graph in Figure 2),
entrepreneurs are disproportionately wealthy. All these ndings are consistent with the data.
We further compare the wealth of college educated and non-college educated entrepreneurs
(the lower-right graph in Figure 2). College educated entrepreneurs are wealthier, because of
their higher labor productivity and also because creditors require a higher wealth threshold
to lend to college educated entrepreneurs, since the value of working (related to the earnings
from default) is higher for them.33 The ratio of wealth among those with and without college
is 3:9 in the model, and 3:5 in the data of Diaz-Jimenez et al (1997).34
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
5.1 Comparing constraints
In the model, college attendance is limited by a credit constraint, and also a¤ected by the
productivity terms x and y. What is the impact of this constraint on equilibrium behavior?
It turns out that if the newborn has no entrepreneurial opportunity (x = 0) then agents only
go to college if they have wealth above a certain level see Figure 3. This level is decreasing
in y and increasing in the cost of college. Thus, the model accounts for the nding in Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2011) and others that high-ability workers are more likely to have gone
to college, as well as agents with higher initial wealth.
33In a model of this kind, the probability of entrepreneurship is increasing in wealth. Empirically, Hurst
and Lusardi (2004) nd that the probability of entrepreneurship is fairly at over much of the wealth
distribution. As in Cagetti and de Nardi (2006), we nd that repeating the Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
estimation using samples of agents drawn from the model yields condence intervals that cover their estimated
wealth-entrepreneurship prole. Results are available upon request.
34Diaz-Jimenez et al (1997) report income for agents with and without high school: we weight them using
the shares in Mondragón-Vélez (2009).
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
If the newborn does have an entrepreneurial opportunity (x > 0), the decision rule has a
di¤erent structure which underlines the interaction between education, entrepreneurship and
credit constraints. For low values of y, no agent goes to college: college is una¤ordable for
low-wealth agents, and entrepreneurship preferable for high-wealth agents. For high values
of y, things are more complicated. Again, if agents have low wealth they do not go to college
as they cannot a¤ord it nor do they become entrepreneurs, see Figures 3 and 4. Above a
certain level of wealth agents can a¤ord college and they do attend, and this is preferable to
entrepreneurship because of their low wealth, which would lead their rms to be unprotably
small. Finally there is another higher wealth threshold above which again agents to do not
go to college. In this case their wealth is su¢ cient for the returns from entrepreneurship
to outweigh the higher wages from going to college. Thus, even though the specication of
education and entrepreneurship in the model economy is very parsimonious, there will be a
few young high-ability agents who become entrepreneurs instead of completing college, some
Bill Gates.As before, high-y agents are more likely than low-y agents to go to college even
when x = xhigh.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
What is the macroeconomic impact of constraints on education? We compared the
behavior of the benchmark economy with 2 other economies. In one, there is no punishment
for borrowing, so borrowers default for sure. Thus, credit constraints are at their tightest:
no borrowing will occur for college. In the other economy, the punishment for default is
innity, so any agent may borrow for college if the benets of college exceed those from not
becoming educated for their type. In both experiments the education support function s is
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held constant.
We nd that, relative to the benchmark economy, when borrowing for college is not
allowed then GDP drops to 86% of the benchmark value. Thus, the ability to borrow for col-
lege has a signicant aggregate impact even though there is signicant public aid to college
students. The share of educated agents is 12%, down from 29%. The share of entrepreneurs
with college drops from 41% to 18%. Nonetheless, college educated entrepreneurs are now
2:9 times more protable than their uneducated counterparts. This is because college-goers
are now only those that can attend without borrowing, so any college educated entrepreneurs
will be disproportionately wealthy.
We nd that, when credit constraints on education are removed altogether (i.e. there is
innite punishment for reneging on college loans), the aggregate impact is also signicant.
GDP rises by 12%. The number of college educated agents rises to 44% and the share of
entrepreneurs with college rises to 58%. Thus the model suggests that tightening punishment
on college default also has signicant aggregate impact.
Interestingly, varying between no constraints on education borrowing and full constraints
on education borrowing, entrepreneurship rates vary from 7:20 percent to 7:64 percent, with
the benchmark value in between at 7:50 percent. Thus, education borrowing constraints
do a¤ect entrepreneurship rates, but the e¤ect is small. Their aggregate impact is through
the stock of human capital and the greater physical capital accumulated by more educated
agents, which can then be used by entrepreneurs to expand. Interest rates change negligibly
(by 0:5 percent across scenarios) so the key channel here is self-nancing.
In the introduction we asked whether constraints on the nancing of education could be
important for causing the fat tail: in the US wealth distribution. In the calibrated model,
the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 84% of the wealth. Furthermore, the wealthiest
1% of the population holds 40% of the wealth. 10 percent of the agents in our model have
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zero wealth. When there is no borrowing for education (i.e. punishment for default is zero),
the wealthiest 20% of the population holds 82% of the wealth. The wealthiest 1% of the
population holds 40% of the wealth as before. 10 percent of the agents in our model have zero
wealth. On the other hand, when there are no constraints on borrowing for education (i.e.
punishment for default is innite), the wealthiest 20 percent of the population holds 83% of
the wealth. The wealthiest 1% of the population holds 40% of the wealth as before. 0% of
the agents in our model have zero wealth. Thus, constraints on the nancing of education
are not in fact the principal cause of the fat tail in the income distribution, but being able
to borrow for education without constraints turns out to make a big di¤erence to the poorest
agents i.e., the left tail.
We also nd that the aggregate impact of constraints on entrepreneurs is even larger than
the impact of education constraints. For example, recall that when we vary the punishment
for reneging on an education loan between zero and innity, GDP ranges from 86% to 112%
of the benchmark value. This range of GDP values relative to the benchmark is obtained by
varying the value of the entrepreneurial punishment parameter f from 0:37 to 0:43 (recall
that the benchmark value is f = 0:4083). We nd that, relative to the benchmark economy,
when borrowing for entrepreneurship is not allowed at all (f = 0, no punishment) then GDP
drops to 64% of the benchmark value. This is a large value, and it is due to the fact that the
ability to borrow in the calibrated economy is critical for entrepreneurs with relatively low
wealth to be able to achieve a reasonable scale of operation. The number of entrepreneurs
drops to 4:5% of the workforce. The share of educated agents is 26%, down from 29%. The
share of entrepreneurs with college rises from 41% to 42%. Interestingly college educated
entrepreneurs are now only 1:9 times more protable than their uneducated counterparts.
This is because the wealth distribution is atter, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth drops to 0:71.
The capital-output ratio drops to 2:9. Since capital is hard to borrow it becomes expensive
(the interest rate rises by 1:7 percentage points), limiting the returns to entrepreneurship
and hence also to college, relative to the calibrated economy. Thus, credit constraints on
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entrepreneurs have a substantial impact on the incentive to go to college.
5.2 Policy Experiments
We now conduct some policy experiments to evaluate the impact of the nancing of ed-
ucation on the aggregate economy. We perform several experiments, mainly by changing
the support function s (). First, we examine environments in which the cost of college is
subsidized. This allows us to assess the extent to which support for college education in
general a¤ects aggregate outcomes. Second, we examine environments in which the cost of
college is subsidized only for agents who cannot a¤ord it i.e. there are educational grants.
This allows us to assess the extent to which support for college education taking account of
wealth a¤ects aggregate outcomes. Finally, we compare educational subsidies to other policy
measures in our economic environment.
5.3 Welfare
An important part of our analysis will be the impact of policy on welfare. In a representative
agent context, welfare is commonly measured using the per-period increase in consumption in
the steady state equilibrium that would make the agent indi¤erent between the environments
with and without policy the compensating variation. We require a welfare criterion that
is applicable to a heterogeneous agent environment. A type-by-type comparison of agent
welfare is not appropriate since the number of agents of each type is endogenous and since
agent identities are unrelated to their types. Thus we propose the following welfare criterion.
Dene environment O to be the steady state equilibrium of the benchmark economy, and
let environment P be the equilibrium of an economy with some policy. Now consider an
agent who is not in the model, but has preferences the same as the agents in the model.
This agent will be randomly dropped into environment O. The agent does not, however,
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know what type (a; x; y; e; g) she will be. The probability that the agent has a given type
is determined by the equilibrium measure of agent types !. The welfare criterion is the
percentage of consumption that should be added to each agent in environment O such that
the agent would be indi¤erent between being dropped into environment O or environment
P . This criterion is based on the original positionconcept in Rawls (1971), but assumes
that agents maximize expected utility as argued in Harsanyi (1975), since all agents have
the same utility function in our environment. We name this an OP compensating variation.
Of course there are changes in the economic environment that benet many agents,
and other changes that benet few agents. A change that benets all agents by a certain
amount, and a di¤erent change that benets a few agents by a huge amount, may have a
similar OP compensating variation. As a result, from a welfare perspective, we are interested
in distinguishing between these two scenarios, since they have very di¤erent distributional
implications. In one case agents are generally better o¤, whereas in another they are better
o¤ on average because some of them have a small shot at a very high payo¤. We identify
these two scenarios by seeing whether a particular change in the environment generates
changes in both GDP and in welfare that are of the same order of magnitude. If they are,
we call it an equitablechange. If they are not, we call it an inequitablechange.
5.4 The impact of US college nance
First, to evaluate the impact of the current US nancing scheme as calibrated, we remove
all support by setting s (e; ; a) = 0. We nd that welfare and output decrease signicantly
once educational subsidies are removed. Welfare by the OP criterion drops by 9 percent, and
GDP drops by 12 percent. The number of agents who attend college decreases sharply from
29 to 15 percent. Interestingly the number of entrepreneurs changes only from 7:5 percent to
7:2 percent, suggesting that the current level of education support in the US is not enough to
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signicantly change the wealth of young would-be entrepreneurs who graduate from college.
This indicates that the current scheme providing nancial support for education is e¤ective
at resolving to some extent the limited enforcement problems in the market for education.
The ratio of the earnings of college educated to those of non-college educated entrepreneurs
rises from 2:3 to 2:7, yet the share of entrepreneurs with college drops from 0:41 to 0:22.
Thus, fewer agents can a¤ord college, and those that can are wealthy, so that when they
become entrepreneurs they are disproportionately able to generate income.
5.4.1 Subsidized education
A broad way to get a sense of how important government support for education can be is to
consider a simple subsidy towards the costs of college. This is useful because it tells us how
general support for the education sector matters for aggregate outcomes, and also because
comparing subsidy outcomes to the US regime gives us a sense of the equivalent subsidy
scheme, a sense of the intensity of actual support for the education sector.
The government nances the education cost for newborn agents at rate & 2 [0; 1]. Agents
face an education cost of  (1; )  (1   &), and for each college student the government
provides a subsidy of  (1; )  &, if the agent chooses to attend college given this nancing
arrangement. The subsidy is nanced from taxation in the same way as pension payments,
and the budget constraint must hold with equality each period.35
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Figure 5 shows that GDP, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth, the college share of population
and the share of entrepreneurs generally rise with the subsidy rate &. The subsidies increase
35Tax rates in our policy experiments vary little, ranging between 21 and 23 percent.
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output because increased college attendance raises worker productivity and also increases
the number of entrepreneurs, who are also less credit constrained. On the other hand the
subsidies also lead to greater wealth inequality because wealth is more concentrated among
the educated entrepreneurs. A 100% subsidy to education (& = 1) leads to a rise in welfare
of 38:3 percent a signicant amount. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases indicating
that there is increasing inequality, because more college educated agents means more entre-
preneurs. Notably, however, a 100% subsidy is not the most e¢ cient level in terms of GDP
or welfare, because past a certain point taxation becomes burdensome. Above about 70%
(& = 0:7) the policy does little to encourage college attendance and entrepreneurship, so the
policy becomes mainly redistributive. Above this rpoint, GDP is at and welfare actually
decreases as the subsidy rate rises.
It is notable that the wage hardly changes: even when & = 1 the e¢ ciency wage w is only
2 percent higher than when & = 0. Similarly, the interest rate only varies from 9:55 percent
when there are no subsidies to 9:32 percent when college is fully subsidized. The large impact
on income and welfare is due to the much larger stock of human capital encouraged by the
subsidies, in the form of college-educated agents, rather than general equilibrium e¤ects
related to prices. With more college educated agents, there are also more entrepreneurs,
because agents are wealthier and thus less likely to be constrained in their scale of operation.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
The level of entrepreneurship varies between 0:073 and 0:082 depending on the subsidy
rate, a fairly small change. The reason it is small is because the probability of getting
an entrepreneurial opportunity is the same for all agents, regardless of education (note
that this is a result from the calibration process, not a modeling assumption). This means
that the number of educated people has no impact on the number of agents who have an
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entrepreneurial opportunity at a given point in time. Instead, the number of entrepreneurs
will only change to the extent that people who previously had an entrepreneurial opportunity
but turned it down due to insu¢ cient wealth, now have enough wealth for it to be worth
pursuing the opportunity. This is the "marginal potential entrepreneur": a person who has
an entrepreneurial opportunity and has just enough wealth to make them indi¤erent between
pursuing it and not pursing it. Since the wealth distribution is very spread out, a change in
this wealth threshold a¤ects only a small share of the population.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
Since this represents only a small reduction in the number of agents working, it is not
enough to signicantly change the wage rate see Figure 6. Similarly, the interest rate varies
between these two scenarios only by about 4 percent of its benchmark value. The increase
in capital generated by having more educated agents is o¤set by the increase in the scale of
entrepreneurial operations and thus the demand for capital.
Notice that the increase in welfare from subsidies can be larger than the increase in wel-
fare from eliminating credit constraints on education nance. The reason is that educational
nancing constraints are not the only market failures in this economy: constraints on entre-
preneurs exist also. Subsidies imply that students who go to college will have more wealth
when they graduate, leading them to be able to nance any entrepreneurial opportunities
that might come along at a more e¢ cient level as well as having more wealth they could
lend to other agents who might have entrepreneurial opportunities. This policy not only
relaxes the college credit constraint but also the entrepreneurial credit constraint. This is
consistent with our survey results, where countries with greater support for college education
tend to have more protable entrepreneurs who are less likely to report nancing constraints
as a limitation.
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Figure 6 displays some additional statistics regarding the impact of subsidies on the model
economy. Notice that tax rates, and transfers as a share of GDP, do not rise monotonically
with increased subsidization of education. This is because support for education is a small
share of GDP, and because increased income from having a more productive workforce implies
that the governments funding committments can be met without necessarily raising taxes.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Figure 7 displays the wealth distribution by occupation and education groups. It is
interesting that, aside from uneducated entrepreneurs, no group displays a signicant increase
in wealth as subsidies increase. In part, this is because the composition of these groups by
(x; y) type is di¤erent: as more agents become educated, agents with lower y are more likely
to be educated, so that the wealth of the educated workers tends to decline with sunsidies.
Rather, it is changes in the educational composition of the economy (i.e. changes in the
number of agents represented in each panel in Figure 7) rather than changes in the wealth
and earnings of agents in each panel that causes the overall wealth of the economy to increase.
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Figure 8 displays welfare by occupation and education. Again, it is di¢ cult to
interpret each panel because, aside from income determinants such as the interest rate and
wage rate changing over time, the composition of each group varies with the subsidy rate,
both in terms of wealth a and in terms of agent types (x; y). However, it is notable that
the overall impact on welfare as subsidies rise in Figure 5 is much larger than what we see
for particular groups in any of these panels. In other words, once again, it is the shift in
agents between educational and wealth types that accounts for the welfare results in Figure
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5, rather than what happens to any particular education-occupation combination.
Finally it is useful to know what intensity of subsidies is equivalent to the US nancing
scheme. A subsidy of 27% generates the same 36level of GDP as the US scheme in the
calibrated economy. A 28% subsidy generates the same level of welfare as the US scheme.
Thus, the US scheme lies about a third of the way in terms of the broad spectrum of possible
nancial support of college education.
So far we have assumed that the cost of college is not sensitive to changes in the college
nancing regime. What if the increased availability of college support leads the cost of
college to rise? To do this, suppose that the cost of college is a function of the subsidy rate,
so  (1; ) =  (1; )  (1  '&). Here ' is the pass-through rate: ' = 0 means the cost of
college is una¤ected by support, whereas ' = 1 implies that a subsidy increases the cost of
college proportionately. We then set  so that, in the case where & = 0:27, the cost of college
is the same as in the benchmark economy recall that, in terms of the impact of welfare and
on GDP, the US nancing scheme is similar to a subsidy of 27 percent.37 Thus, if we assume
a pass-through rate of about 50 percent, as found in Lucca, Nadauld and Shen (2015) we
nd that the range of outcomes achievable through subsidies is not noticeably a¤ected. See
Figure 9. Thus, our ndings are in fact robust to a signicant amount of pass-through from
the nancing scheme to the cost of college.
36This is not to say that general equilibrium e¤ects are not important at all. We repeated our subsidy
experiments while forcing the occupational decision rules to be the same as in the benchmark economy and
found that subsidies tended to have slightly stronger impact on aggregates. Since wages rise with subsidies
in equilibrium, this increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship and makes a given type of agent less
likely to pursue entrepreneurship. The impact of educational subsidies on wealth swamps the impact of
prices on decision rules.
37It also turns out that, in the benchmark economy, a total of 30:3 percent of all college costs are covered
by grants subsidies or other state support.
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5.4.2 Grants
Now we examine education cost grants for those agents who need to borrow to attend college.
Thus if an agent has assets a where a <  (1; ), then the government subsidizes the cost of
college above their assets at rate & 2 [0; 1], providing &  ( (1; )  a), if the agent is willing
and able to attend college. Again, these subsidies are nanced out of general taxation and
the government budget constraint must be satised each period. We assume there is no
pass-through in this experiment.
In Figure 10; wealth inequality and the college educated population rise with the grant
rate. A 100% grant for students who cannot a¤ord college raises welfare by about as much
as a similar subsidy. Again, the policy generally raises wealth inequality because it enables
more entrepreneurship, up to a point beyond which it becomes a pure transfer that does not
create any benets (e.g., as with subsidies, the college share attens out).
FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE
Again, it is useful to know what intensity of subsidies is equivalent to the US nancing
scheme. A grant rate of 50% generates the same level of GDP as the US scheme in the
calibrated economy. A 52% grant rate generates the same level of welfare as the US scheme.
Thus, in the model economy, needbased grants can have a large impact on welfare and on
income, although not as large as subsidies. The US scheme is about half way in terms of the
possible scope of needbased support for education.
Figure 11 shows that, as with subsidies, tax rates are not monotonic in the extent of
subsidization. Since educational grants boost GDP, they do not necessarily require an in-
crease in tax rates. Figure 12 displays the wealth distribution by occupation and education
groups and shows results that mirror those of educational subsidies: aside from uneducated
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entrepreneurs, no group displays a signicant increase in wealth as subsidies increase. It
is changes in the educational composition of the economy (i.e. changes in the number of
agents represented in each panel in Figure 7) rather than changes in the wealth and earnings
of agents in each panel that causes the overall wealth of the economy to increase. Finally,
Figure 13 show that the subsidies do not necessarily have a positive e¤ect on agents of any
particular educational level or occupation. Rather, it is the large shifts in people among
groups that lead to the large welfare and GDP increases seen in Figure 11:
FIGURES 11; 12 AND 13 ABOUT HERE
With grants, as with subsidies, the wealth of any particular type of worker does not
necessarily rise with support  see Figure 12, which is similar to Figure 7. Instead, it is
changes in the educational composition of the economy that causes the overall wealth of the
economy to increase, rather than what happens within any particular category. The same
applies to welfare in Figure 13:
5.5 Discussion
The impact of educational nance policy on aggregates in the model is found to be potentially
substantial. These results should be taken as benchmarks, but they are likely to be robust
to changing key assumptions of the model assumptions of the model, as we now discuss.
Di¤erent ways of modeling the labor market could a¤ect the quantitative conclusions For
example, in general an increase in the supply of an input (e.g. college-educated labor) might
be expected to lower its relative price. However, Acemoglu (2002) shows that an increase
in skilled labor may under certain conditions lead to an increase in its relative price in an
environment with induced technical change. Thus it is not a priori clear how a change in
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the supply of college-educated agents will a¤ect the college wage premium. This is the sense
in which our policy results are a benchmark: they are agnostic as to the manner in which
the supply of college labor might a¤ect the skill premium. At the same time, the qualitative
features of the policy analysis should be robust, as should the orders of magnitude. For
example, if some variable X changes a lot in response to policy, very strong o¤setting e¤ects
would be required to overturn this result in an alternative environment. A related caveat
is that this exercise assumes that the price of college itself is not a¤ected by changes in the
college nancing regime. There is some work that suggests that (at least in the short run)
such pass-through from college support to college prices may exist see for example Lucca,
Nadauld and Shen (2015). We showed that our results are not signicantly a¤ected by the
possibility of pass-through in Section 5:4:1 above.
An assumption of our model is that college increases worker remuneration because it
increases its productivity. An alternative approach would be for college-educated workers
and others to be imperfect substitutes in the production function. Following Acemoglu
(2002), suppose that the aggregate production function were of the form:
Y = AK
h
(LNL)
" 1
" + (HNH)
" 1
"
i "
" 1 (1 )
where i is the productivity of labor of type i, Ni is the quantity of labor of type i and
i 2 fL;Hg indicating low skill or high skill. Suppose that L = 1 without loss of generality,
and set H = 1:4 as in the text. The production function in the model is equivalent to this
as "!1. One might ask: how might the results change if " were nite?
We suspect that with nite " the impact of educational support on aggregates and welfare
will share the same pattern as in the basline model increasing up to a certain point, and
decreasing once the college-educated share of the workforce is large. To see why, consider the
following back-of-the-envelope exercise. First, note that the share of the workforce that is
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college-educated is about 0:33 when there are no subsidies at all. With 100 percent subsidies
this increases to about 0:95 in the model. The observed increase in GDP between the two
extremes is a factor of 1:477. On the other hand, consider how output might increase as
NH increases from zero to one, and NL = 1 NH in the aggregate production function (i.e.
ignoring the small share of workers who are entrepreneurs, since it changes little). As "!1,
output will increase by a factor of 1:1535 if we vary NH between 0:33 and 0:95 and hold
K constant. In other words, the remaining two thirds of the impact of subsidies on GDP
acts through increases in the capital stock and improvements in the allocation of capital,
not through the direct impact of expanding the skilled labor force. The peak is around 80%
subsidies.
If we have a nite elasticity (estimates in the literature are positive, tending to range
between 2 and 4 see the ndings and surveys in Blankenau and Cassou (2011) and Mollick
(2011) inter alia) it might be that GDP does not increase monotonically with the share of
college-educated agents as before, but that the turning point is at a lower subsidy rate. If
we repeat the above experiment with " = 2 and holding the capital stock constant, the
maximum GDP is obtained when NH = 0:55. When " = 3, the maximum GDP is obtained
when NH = 0:63. When " = 4, the maximum GDP is obtained when NH = 0:70. The
maximum impact of subsidies would then be somewhere around these numbers depending
on what the relevant elasticity of substitution is thought to be. On the other hand, it is
important to remember that educated labor is generally viewed as being complementary to
capital  see for example Krusell et al (2000). This means that, as more people become
educated, capital accumulates, which further raises the return to capital. Since there are
contradictory e¤ects, this would require a separate study to compare against our benchmark
framework the importance of these elasticities.
Another assumption of our model is that the total labor supply is exogenous, aside from
the occupational choice decision. One might wonder whether allowing labor supply to be
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endogenous would shrink overall labor supply with the tax increase, possibly a¤ecting the
welfare computations. This is unlikely to happen for several reasons. First, given that most
agentsearnings are substantially higher after the policy, if labor supply were endogenous
it would likely increase, rather than decreasing. Second, even if it were decreasing, in any
reasonable calibration the labor supply elasticity should be such that its equilibrium value
does not vary much, certainly not beyond the range of values observed for developing coun-
tries. Rogerson (2001) nds that this range is small, an order of magnitude less than the
impact on GDP. Third, across the subsidy experiments the tax rates only vary from 20:6
to 23:5 percent, too small to make much di¤erence in any reasonably calibrated model with
endogenous labor supply.
We assumed that entrepreneurs are not taxed in the model: all taxes come out of wage
income. We make this assumption because in practice entrepreneurs pay lower taxes than
laborers see Cullen and Gordon (2002). First, entrepreneurs have incentives to under-report
their income to avoid taxes, and this is easier for business-owners than for wage earners.
Second, the existence of carryforwards and carrybacks allows entrepreneurs to avoid taxes
by using losses in any particular year to o¤set taxable income in other years. Third, it is
easy to incorporate, where the e¤ective tax rate is 15 percent or lower substantially lower
than for wage earners. If we were to tax entrepreneurs our results would not change much,
however, because when we increase support for education the tax rates in the economy rise
by very little. Taxing entrepreneurs makes work relatively more attractive and thus increases
the incentives to defaut, tightening credit constraints and increasing the impact of any policy
that might loosen them. Indeed for robustness we conducted experiments with educational
subsidies allowing entrepreneurial earnings to be taxed at half the rate of workers, and the
impact of subsidies on aggregates was a little stronger in that framework, but the overall
picture is similar.
Our model of entrepreneurship is fairly simple: there are no entry costs and there are only
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two values of entrepreneurial productivity xt. We do this for several reasons. As mentioned
earlier, this is a complex model with many dimensions and the run-time of a model with
more values of xt (particularly the run-time of the calibration process) would be prohibitive.
In addition, we are building on the model of Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), which also has
only two values of xt yet is able to match the wealth distribution (ignoring education) very
well. Maintaining this assumption ensures that our ndings particularly at the calibration
stage can easily be compared and contrasted with theirs. It would be interesting in future
work to see how the model behavior might be sensitive to having more values of xt not
just in our context, but for this class of model in general. This would likely make agents
decision problems and occupational choices smoother so that the impact of policy changes
on aggregates would be smoother accordingly.
In our model, the only risk faced by entrepreneurs is that the business opportunity disap-
pears which happens with probability out or outout depending on the level of education.
If there were a new kind of shock that materializes before he/she has paid the loan back that
means that they cannot do so, then we speculate that there could be a risk premium in the
model depending on the likelihood of this risk. That would likely make credit constraints
on borrowers even tighter, increasing the impact of educational subsidies. Allowing for this
kind of default risk would be interesting to introduce in future work as it might be useful for
understanding changes over time in the rates of college loan default.
One might also wonder what could happen if there were an entry cost. We did not
consider that because the formal cost of starting a rm in the US is very small see Djankov
et al (2002). In contrast, startup costs would have to be very large compared to the potential
earnings of the entrepreneurs to make any di¤erence to the results. As an empirical matter,
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) nd that higher initial capital requirements do not appear to be an
important determinant of entrepreneursability to borrow. In any case introducing startup
costs would just raise the amount of capital needed to start a rm, exacerbating nancing
53
constraints and amplifying the e¤ects in the paper.
We allow agents to work while in college. We make this assumption because typically
students in college do work.38 Most of them do not work full time, of course. Still, recall
that the model compresses college into one period. This means that students only earn one
years wages against the cost of 4 years of college, equivalent to having them work only part
time (as most do). We could allow college in the model to take 4 periods, of course, which
would be an interesting extension which, given uncertainty about xt and yt, would allow
us to study student drop-out rates (and perform counterfactual experiments to study the
determinants of those rates). That would be a very interesting extension of our framework.
In that case we would calibrate the model so that college students may only work part time.
6 Conclusion
We study the interaction of credit constraints on education and on entrepreneurship. En-
trepreneurs are disproportionately college-educated, and college-educated entrepreneurs are
more protable. We nd in our model that, even though education and entrepreneurship
rates are highly sensitive to the di¤erential returns to entrepreneurship across educational
groups, these ndings are because the college educated are wealthier, not because they are
intrinsically better entrepreneurs, consistent with the European survey data. Thus, educa-
tion benets entrepreneurship indirectly, by raising the earnings and wealth available for
would-be entrepreneurs. This is an important nding that is worthy of corroboration using
disaggregated data in the future.
Interestingly, the aggregate impact of education policy that subsidizes education through
redistribution is larger than the impact of removing the nancing constraints on education.
38Recently up to 70 percent of college students worked, with about 25 percent working full
time. See https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/29/more-college-students-are-working-while-studying.html, last
checked 3/11/2018.
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The reason is that, by generating more high-earning college graduates, education policy has
a powerful e¤ect on physical capital accumulation in the economy, making capital cheaper
and more available and loosening the credit constraints experienced by entrepreneurs, as
well as ensuring this capital is accumulated by a large number of agents. This is consistent
with our survey results, where in European countries with more support for tertiary edu-
cation entrepreneurs report lighter credit constraints and higher protability. Thus, taking
the constraints on entrepreneurs as given, subsidizing education turns out to be a way to
substantially raise welfare and GDP in the long-run. It would be interesting to see whether
these conclusions are robust to di¤erent approaches to modeling education and self employ-
ment, but this paper sets a benchmark in the context of a modeling framework that is known
to deliver a strong match to the wealth distribution.
In what is already a complicated economic environment, we abstract from some important
factors that might a¤ect both entrepreneurship and education, such as learning. In some
models of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs learn about their types. Such an environment
would require new dimensions of heterogeneity but would allow for richer and more complex
dynamics, and could endogenize exit. Similarly, it may be that agents do not know their
suitability for college, di¤ering in some sort of ability distinct from labor productivity y,
and they learn this in college. Finally a model in which agents overlap with their parents so
that there is inter-vivo giving would be interesting too. Such a model would likely require
both parents and children to care about each other, again signicantly raising the level of
complexity in the model. We also abstract from the eld of study of the educated: while our
presentations of this work suggested that there is a common belief that entrepreneurship is
more common in certain elds or professions, Lazear (2005) nds that entrepreneurs tend to
be generalists, suggesting that a students college major may not be a rst order determinant
of their future entrepreneurial decisions. This remains an open question.
Also our model of college is simple. There exists a technology whereby agents may
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increase their human capital at a cost. An extension that includes a more detailed model
of the market for college would be interesting to the extent that the cost of college might
in turn respond to the policy considerations raised in this paper. Such a model would be
suitable for studying the causes of the recent rise in the cost of college in the US, and is left
for future work.
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Figure 1 The Golden Triangle: interrelations between credit
constraints on education and on entrepreneurship.
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Figure 2 Wealth distribution by occupation and education.
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Figure 3 Decision rule for going to college. Each line corresponds to
the income threshold y above which agents attend college in equilibrium, for a
given college cost  (1; ) . Conditional on wealth, higher labor productivity is
associated with a greater likelihood of college attendance among workers.
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Figure 5 Subsidies to college and macroeconomic aggregates. Each panel plots
the extent to which the cost of college is subsidized against a statistic drawn from
the model economy.
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Figure 6 Subsidies to college and additional macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 7 Wealth by group and educational subsidies.
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Figure 8 Welfare by group and educational subsidies. The welfare is
the proportional compensating variation relative to the benchmark economy.
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Figure 9 Subsidies to college and macroeconomic aggregates. Each panel plots
the extent to which the cost of college is subsidized against a statistic drawn from
the model economy. Assumes 50 percent pass-through from subsidies to the cost
of college.
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Figure 10 Education grants for college and macroeconomic aggregates. Each panel plots
the extent to which the cost of college above the agents wealth is subsidized
against a statistic drawn from the model economy.
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Figure 11 Additional aggregate statistics regarding educational grants.
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Figure 12 Wealth by group and educational grants.
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Figure 13 Welfare by group and educational grants.
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